Immutable backups - how to protect your backups against ransomware
Attackers deliberately delete or encrypt backups. How immutable backups work with Veeam, which options are available and which pitfalls you should be aware of.
Immutable backups are backups that can be neither changed nor deleted for a defined period, not even with stolen administrator rights in the backup software. This means they remain usable after a ransomware attack, even if the attackers deliberately search for the backups. However, this protection only becomes effective in combination with separate credentials, hardened systems, an off-site or offline copy and tested restores.
We explain what ‘immutable’ means technically, which options Veeam Backup & Replication offers (as of version 13.1, October 2026), where protection fails in practice - and give you a checklist for SMEs.
Why do attackers deliberately target backups?
Extortion only works if the victim cannot simply restore from the backup. In its ransomware catalogue of measures, the BSI (Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security) writes that it is now common for attackers who have previously obtained administrator rights to search specifically for all backups and to encrypt them just like the production systems. Citing its 2025 Ransomware Trends Report, Veeam reports that the backup repositories were also attacked at 89% of the organisations affected.
Small and medium-sized businesses are by no means a marginal phenomenon here. According to the BSI’s 2025 situation report, the number of reported ransomware attacks remained largely unchanged at 950 according to findings of the BKA (Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office), and 80% of these hit SMEs. The BSI states that backups remain essential against ransomware but do not help against data leaks. The IT-Grundschutz framework also requires in CON.3.A14, as a basic requirement, that backups cannot be overwritten either deliberately or accidentally.
What does ‘immutable’ mean - and what does it not mean?
With an immutable backup, the storage system itself sets a lock with an expiry date. Until then, the file can be read and copied, but not changed, moved or deleted, regardless of which commands the backup software receives. This distinguishes immutability from related terms:
| Approach | What it achieves | What it does not achieve |
|---|---|---|
| Immutability | Backups are locked against changes and deletion for a fixed period, even if the backup console is compromised | Does not protect if attackers control the storage layer itself, for example via root rights, hardware management or the time source |
| Offline/air gap | There is no network path to the copy, so remote attacks come to nothing | Data is not immediately available, and the separation must be maintained organisationally |
| Deletion protection/recycle bin | Deleted backups are retained for a set period | The files are not technically locked; the delete command is merely delayed |
| Encryption | Protects confidentiality if backups fall into the wrong hands | Prevents neither deletion nor re-encryption by attackers |
The BSI recommends keeping at least one copy offline, for example on separate tapes or in cloud storage completely separated from your own network, and checking this separation regularly: a domain administrator should try, as a test, to access the separated copies - this must not succeed. Immutability and an offline copy therefore complement each other; they do not replace each other.
Important: immutable does not automatically mean recoverable. A backup may already contain malware or be incomplete. How to check this regularly is described in our guide Testing restores.
What options are there for implementing immutability with Veeam?
| Option | How it works | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux Hardened Repository | Linux server with XFS; Veeam sets the immutable attribute for 7 to 9,999 days | Fast on-site restore, space-saving Fast Clone technology, no ongoing storage fees | Requires hardening, physical protection and Linux skills; usually located at the same site |
| Object storage with S3 Object Lock | Veeam locks each object in compliance mode, 1 to 999 days | Can also be used off-site, flexibly scalable | Lock is extended by 10 or 30 days (costs); bucket settings must be exactly right |
| Tape: WORM or stored off-site | WORM cartridges cannot be overwritten; tapes stored off-site are offline | Genuine separation from the network, cost-effective for long retention | Manual work, slower restore, tape hardware required |
| Copy at the Cloud Connect provider | Backup copy job to the cloud repository; the provider enables immutability and/or Insider Protection | Off-site, provider’s own administration environment, no storage hardware of your own | Large restores over the internet connection take time; GFS retention required |
Linux Hardened Repository
The Hardened Repository is a Linux server with block storage (no NFS or SMB share); Veeam recommends XFS and a physical server with local disks. A Veeam service sets the lock via the file system’s immutable attribute. Authentication uses single-use credentials that Veeam does not store, or a certificate. In version 13, Veeam recommends the Veeam Infrastructure Appliance: SSH is not possible on it, and it cannot join a domain. On self-installed servers, you should permanently disable SSH after setup. Backup jobs must run as forward incremental with regular full backups, and backup copy jobs require GFS retention.
Object storage with S3 Object Lock: governance or compliance?
S3 Object Lock has two modes. In governance mode, users with a special permission may remove the lock or delete objects. In compliance mode, nobody can delete a locked object before it expires, not even the root user; according to AWS, the only option left is then to delete the entire account. Veeam sets compliance mode for every uploaded object. You usually have to enable Object Lock and versioning when creating the bucket, and default retention and lifecycle rules must not be set. Since version 13.1, Veeam also offers a governance mode for normal Linux repositories, in which system administrators can still delete - and which is correspondingly weaker against attackers with administrator rights.
Tape: WORM media and cartridges stored off-site
WORM tapes can only be written once. Veeam manages them in dedicated media pools without retention periods. The tape library must support WORM. Normal tapes that are ejected after writing and stored separately are just as effective: they are offline and therefore out of reach for remote attacks.
Copy at the Cloud Connect provider
Veeam itself describes the risk in the Cloud Connect documentation: anyone who takes over the customer’s backup console can also delete the off-site copies in the cloud repository from there. There are two functions to counter this. With immutability, the provider operates the cloud repository as a Hardened Repository, for example; backups can then not be deleted before the retention period expires, not even from the customer console. With Insider Protection, Veeam moves deleted backups to a recycle bin at the provider for a defined number of days, invisible to the customer and recoverable via the provider. Enable GFS retention for backup copy jobs. And note: according to Veeam, your Veeam configuration backup does not become immutable in such a cloud repository - keep a further copy of it.
Typical pitfalls in practice
- Immutability period and retention do not match: the lock takes precedence over job retention. On the Hardened Repository, GFS full backups remain locked for their entire GFS period, so yearly backups may be locked for years; with object storage, a further 10 or 30 days are added. Plan storage and costs with a buffer, because no space can be freed before the period expires.
- Hardware management left open: anyone who controls iDRAC, iLO or comparable remote management can reinstall the system or wipe the disks. Disable this access, or separate it from the rest of the network and protect it with MFA.
- Root access to the repository: any user with root rights can remove the immutable attribute on Linux again. Therefore: no SSH, no sudo rights for the service account, and lock the root account.
- Unreliable time source: the lock depends on the system time. Veeam detects time jumps and blocks the clean-up of old backups if the time jumps by more than 24 hours. Nevertheless, use a reliable NTP source.
- Backup server in the production domain: for small and medium-sized environments, Veeam recommends a separate workgroup; for large environments, a dedicated management domain in a separate Active Directory forest.
- Shared credentials: identical passwords for the domain, backup console, storage, cloud account and hardware management cancel out any separation.
- Missing MFA: without a second factor, a single intercepted password for the backup console or cloud account is enough. The cloud account in particular needs protection, because in compliance mode deleting it is the remaining lever.
What other protection features does Veeam offer?
- Multi-factor authentication (since version 12, February 2023): one-time codes from an authenticator app for the console and web interface. Since 13.1, changes to users and roles require additional confirmation when MFA is active.
- Four-eyes principle (since 12.1, December 2023): deleting backups, removing repositories or changing users and MFA requires approval by a second administrator. Since 13.1, this also applies to disabling or shortening immutability. Availability depends on the licence, and according to Veeam the function does not protect if the backup server itself is compromised.
- Malware detection during backup (since 12.1): Veeam analyses the data stream for encryption patterns (entropy) and the file system indexes for suspicious activity, and flags affected restore points.
- Secure Restore: before restoring, Veeam checks the restore point with an antivirus scanner, with YARA rules (since 12.1) or with its own scanner Veeam Threat Hunter (since 12.3). The BSI recommends exactly this check before a restore.
- Security & Compliance Analyzer (in 13.1): checks, among other things, whether MFA is active, whether immutable or offline media are used, whether the Hardened Repository runs on physical hardware and whether the backup server is outside the production domain.
Checklist for SMEs
- Keep at least one copy immutable and one off-site or offline.
- Align the immutability period with the realistic time until an attack is discovered, and calculate the storage requirement including GFS.
- Remove the backup server and repositories from the production domain.
- Use separate, strong credentials for each layer.
- Enable MFA for the backup console, cloud accounts and hardware management.
- On the Hardened Repository, disable SSH, lock root, and disable or isolate iDRAC or iLO.
- Set up a reliable time source and monitor alerts about time jumps.
- Enable the four-eyes principle and malware detection, if licensed.
- Store the configuration backup encrypted, outside the backup server.
- Run the Security & Compliance Analyzer regularly.
- Test restores regularly, including from the off-site copy.
Frequently asked questions
Does an immutable copy replace an offline backup?
Not completely. An immutable copy can still be reached over the network and may be vulnerable through mistakes in hardening, the time source or hardware management. The BSI additionally recommends at least one offline copy.
How long should the immutability period be?
There is no universally valid figure. The period should cover how long an attack could go unnoticed. With Veeam, the minimum is 7 days for the Hardened Repository and one day for object storage. Bear in mind: whatever is locked cannot be deleted before the period expires, so longer periods require more storage.
Does immutability also protect against data theft?
No. Immutable backups safeguard recovery, but they do not prevent attackers from exfiltrating data and threatening to publish it. That is the job of encryption, access protection and network monitoring.
Conclusion
Immutable backups are now a basic prerequisite for remaining able to act after a ransomware attack. Whether you use a Hardened Repository, object storage with Object Lock, tapes or a copy at a provider depends on data volume, expertise and recovery objectives. A combination often makes sense. What matters is that credentials, hardware management and the time source are protected just as well as the backups themselves, and that you test restores regularly.
As a Veeam Cloud & Service Provider, we support you with Veeam Cloud Connect: your backup copies are transferred, encrypted, to our cloud repository in an ISO/IEC 27001 certified data centre in Germany, and on request additionally encrypted with your own key. Our cloud repository is a Veeam Hardened Repository: immutability and Insider Protection can be booked, and you choose the retention period freely. We provide a data processing agreement (DPA) under Art. 28 GDPR (EU General Data Protection Regulation). You can try the service free of charge for up to 30 days; the trial period always ends at the end of the month. We will be happy to answer your questions at hello@myveeam.cloud or on +49 8106 928 9493.
Sources
- Veeam Help Center: Hardened Repository - Requirements and Limitations (VBR 13.1.1) (11 September 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Hardened Repository (VBR 13.1.1) (27 November 2025)
- Veeam Help Center: How Immutability Works - Hardened Repository (8 September 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Using Veeam Infrastructure Appliance as Hardened Repository (18 June 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Object Storage Immutability - Considerations and Limitations (1 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Block Generation (6 February 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: WORM Tapes (21 June 2023)
- Veeam Cloud Connect Guide: Insider Protection (26 January 2024)
- Veeam Cloud Connect Guide: How Insider Protection Works (accessed 5 October 2026)
- Veeam Cloud Connect Guide: Cloud Repository (29 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Creating Immutable Configuration Backups (14 August 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: What’s New in v13.1 - Backup Repositories (11 August 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: What’s New in v13.1 - Security (24 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Multi-Factor Authentication (28 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Four-Eyes Authorization (10 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Malware Detection (26 August 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Secure Restore (24 July 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Security & Compliance Analyzer (27 August 2026)
- Veeam Help Center: Securing Backup Infrastructure (5 June 2026)
- Veeam Best Practices: WORM Storage with Veeam Hardened Repository (accessed 5 October 2026)
- Veeam Community: Veeam Backup & Replication 12.0 (14 February 2023)
- Veeam press release: Veeam Data Platform 23H2 Update (VBR 12.1) (5 December 2023)
- Veeam Blog: Backup Copy Attack Resistant (30 September 2026)
- AWS: Locking objects with Object Lock (accessed 5 October 2026)
- Linux man page chattr(1) (accessed 5 October 2026)
- BSI: The State of IT Security in Germany 2025 - summary and assessment (in German) (11 November 2025)
- BSI: Ransomware catalogue of measures (Maßnahmenkatalog Ransomware, in German) (23 February 2022)
- BSI IT-Grundschutz: CON.3 Backup concept (Datensicherungskonzept, Edition 2023, in German) (2023)